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WRITING IT RIGHT

Effective Written Advocacy
Before Generalist Judges:
Advice From Recent Decisions
By Douglas E. Abrams

“The Law is Made by the Bar”

“The best job I ever had.”1 That is how retired Congressman, federal circuit judge, and White House Counsel Abner
J. Mikva remembers the judicial clerkship that began his
career 60 years ago.
Fresh out of law school and eager to make their mark,
clerks are fortunate indeed for the opportunity to learn from
a judge with knowledge drawn from years of experience.
But clerks are equally fortunate to learn how much judges
in our adversary system of justice do not know. Recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge is key to success in any
professional pursuit, so lessons in these limits are perhaps
the most valuable mentoring of all for clerks destined to
spend their careers at the bar.
From the commencement of a civil or criminal case, the
limits of the judge’s knowledge reach both facts and law.
Judges receiving papers typically lack the familiarity with
the case that the lawyers may enjoy from having lived with
it before filing. Time spent interviewing clients and witnesses, researching and writing the pleadings, and engaging
in other pretrial give-and-take provides counsel a head start
on fact finding before the judge enters the picture.
Judges in general jurisdiction courts also may not initially be as familiar as counsel with the substantive law that
will decide the case. As American law has grown increasingly intricate and diverse in recent decades, more and
more lawyers have opted for specialty practices.2 Specialization means that judges may come from private or public
sector careers that exposed them regularly to only some of
the substantive law that now fills their dockets. Relatively
few lawyers practice civil and criminal law simultaneously,
and intricate administrative rules and regulations often create doctrine most familiar to specialists.
With these institutional constraints grounded in experience and the complex legal fabric, says the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, “courts rely on lawyers to identify the pertinent facts and law.”3 Because trial and appellate

courts often severely limit oral argument or eliminate it
altogether, identification and persuasion may depend heavily or entirely on counsel’s written submissions.
The reliance cited by the 7th Circuit is a national tradition that actually predates the recent trend toward specialized practice. Trial and appellate judges have long
maintained a “symbiotic”4 relationship with counsel who
“educate the Court”5 with argument tailored to the judge’s
circumstances, needs and expectations. “The law is made
by the Bar, even more than by the Bench,” said then-Judge
Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1885.6 Justice Louis D. Brandeis concurred as he ascended to the Supreme Court bench
in 1916: “A judge rarely performs his functions adequately
unless the case before him is adequately presented.”7 Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote later that “the judicial process
[is] at its best” when courts receive “comprehensive briefs
and powerful arguments on both sides.”8

Two Strategies for Effective Written
Advocacy

Treatises capably explore written trial and appellate
advocacy, and this article makes no effort to duplicate their
depth.9 In recent reported trial and appellate decisions,
however, judges themselves highlight two core strategies
of written advocacy that bear discussion here. First,
advocates should orient the judge who is a newcomer to
the case’s facts, and perhaps also its relevant law; and
second, advocates should avoid jargon best understood
by specialists, which may initially confound the court and
frustrate the bond of communication between writer and
reader.
Orienting the Court
The judge may not initially be as conversant in the applicable law as lawyers who have specialized in the field
for years. “It is unhelpful,” says one district court, “when
attorneys write briefs that presuppose specialized knowledge on the part of their readers.”10
The facts too may initially disorient the trial judge who
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did not pore over drafts of preliminary papers or attend the depositions,
and the appellate judges who did
not preside at the trial or create and
assemble the record step by step.
Discussion of the facts – the bedrock
of most cases, even before application of the law – should not assume
the judge’s familiarity with the case.
When a brief or other written submission cites to depositions, the trial
transcript, or other papers in the record, advocates serve their cause best
by explaining the point they mean to
explain or support.
Unless the court does its own
independent review of the facts and
the law, counsel who fail to provide a
comprehensible pathway risk forfeiting the opportunity to persuade,
and may also risk forfeiting valuable time during oral argument with
avoidable questions from the bench.
“Dropping a judge in the middle of
an alien landscape without a map
and expecting him to get his bearings from fragments of testimony
couched in occupational jargon to
which he has not previously been exposed,” explained one federal district
court, “is not conducive to informed
decisionmaking.”11
Avoiding Jargon
“[T]he realm of the conflicts of
laws,” wrote Dean William J. Prosser
in 1953, “is a dismal swamp, filled
with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious
matters in strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court . . .
is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.”12 Reminders like these
about the law’s frequent complexity
remain valuable for 21st Century
advocates.
Unadorned jargon may serve a
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legal writer’s purpose, or at least may
not detract much from it, when the
audience consists solely of lawyers
trained in the writer’s specialty. But
without this foundation of common
understanding, warns Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 7th Circuit, “much
legal jargon can obscure rather than
illuminate a particular case.”13
In 2008, in Indiana Lumbermens
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reinsurance
Results, Inc., the 7th Circuit held that
the parties’ contract did not require
the plaintiff insurer to pay commissions to the company it had retained
to review the insurer’s reinsurance
claims.14 Writing for the panel, Judge
Posner reported that the parties’ briefs
“were difficult for us judges to understand because of the density of the
reinsurance jargon in them.”15
“There is nothing wrong with a
specialized vocabulary – for use by
specialists,” Judge Posner explained.
“Federal district and circuit judges,
however, . . . are generalists. We hear
very few cases involving reinsurance,
and cannot possibly achieve expertise
in reinsurance practices except by the
happenstance of having practiced in
that area before becoming a judge,
as none of us has. Lawyers should understand the judges’ limited knowledge of specialized fields and choose
their vocabulary accordingly. Every
esoteric term used by the reinsurance
industry has a counterpart in ordinary
English.”16
Judge Posner’s commonsense
advice – to write with an eye for the
judges’ needs and expectations – is
not judicial pettiness. In trial and appellate courts alike, the advice relates
directly to the client’s best interests,
but also to the sound administration
of justice. In an age of swelled dockets and often intricate law, counsel’s

unnecessary reliance on jargon forces
the court to waste valuable time
demystifying avoidable obscurity. By
enhancing the risk that the court will
misapprehend counsel’s key points,
jargon also enhances the risk that the
court will “get it wrong.”
Counsel in Indiana Lumbermens
Mutual Insurance Co., Judge Posner
concluded, “could have saved us
some work and presented their positions more effectively had they done
the translations from reinsurancese
into everyday English themselves.”17
In New Medium LLC v. Barco N.V.,
Judge Posner again urged counsel to
consider the needs of their audience
before writing.18 Sitting by designation as a trial judge, he instructed
the parties that “[a]ll submissions
must be brief and non-technical and
eschew patent-law jargon. Since I am
neither an electrical engineer nor a
patent lawyer, . . . the parties’ lawyers
must translate technical and legal
jargon into ordinary language.”19
Plain English may warrant counsel’s particular attention when the
court reviews an agency decision
because, according to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, veteran
agency personnel may acquire “insights and experience denied judges.
The subtleties . . . encased in jargon
and tucked into interstices of the
administrative scheme, may escape
us.”20 “It is the responsibilities of the
parties to properly educate the court,”
explains a federal district judge, “not
of the court to improperly defer to an
agency decision.”21

Conclusion: Persuading
and Assisting the Court
The 5th Circuit may have exaggerated when it likened judges
sometimes to “sophisticated
uninitiates” when they read or hear
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adversary argument.22 Advocates
convey no condescension, however,
when they write in a respectful
professional tone using, as one
federal district court recommends,
language “intelligible to everyday
speakers of English.”23
As “a representative of clients
[and] an officer of the legal system”
under the ABA Model Code of
Professional Conduct,24 advocates
write with dual goals. “First,” said
Judge Hugh R. Jones of the New
York Court of Appeals, “you seek to
persuade the court of the merit of the
client’s case, to create an emotional
empathy for your position. Then you
assist the court to reach a conclusion
favorable to the client’s interest in
terms of the analysis of the law and
the procedural posture of the case.”25
Advocates persuade and assist most
effectively with the familiar quartet
that marks any legal writing that
strives to connect with the anticipated
audience – precision, conciseness,
simplicity and clarity.26
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Correction
 In the “Missouri Legal Trivia” quiz appearing in the Winter 2011 issue of Precedent, Judge Nannette
Baker was incorrectly identified as the first woman to be appointed as a United States Magistrate Judge for
the Eastern District of Missouri. The correct answer should have been Judge Carol E. Jackson, who became
a United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri in 1986.
We regret the error and any confusion it may have caused.
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